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Abstract. This paper provides a framework based on temporal defeasible logic
to reason about deliberative rule-based cognitive agents. Compared to previous
works in this area our framework has the advantage that it can reason about tem-
poral rules. We show that for rule-based cognitive agents deliberation is more
than just deriving conclusions in terms of their mental components. Our paper is
an extension of [5,6] in the area of cognitive agent programming.
1 Introduction
There are two main trends in the agent literature for programming cognitive agents
in a BDI (belief, desire, intention) framework. The first one is system-based wherein
the main idea is to develop a formal specification language that provides an explicit
representation of states and operations on states that underly any BDI implementation
[14,13,1]. In this approach the main idea is to formalise the operational semantics of the
implemented system. The second one can be termed rule-based where rules are used
to represent or manipulate an agent’s mental attitudes, i.e., an agent consists of a belief
base, goal (desire) base, and intention base specified by logic formulas in the form
of rules [7,3,4,8,15]. In addition to the three mental attitudes of beliefs, desires and
intentions, the works above also include obligations, which are used to denote norms
and commitments of social agents and social rationality. There are also works which
club these two approaches like in [12]. Here we adopt the rule-based approach of [5,6]
and extend it to accommodate temporal defeasible rules.
The main question we try to answer in this paper is:What does it mean to deliberate
for rule/policy-based agents? (By policy we mean a set of rules.) Of particular concern
to us is the reasoning process involved in the deliberation of a rule-based agent wherein
the agent can take a decision at t about what he/she has to do at t ′ based on her beliefs
and policies at t. In such a set up if no relevant event occurs then she can retain her
deliberation at t ′. Consider the following rule
p : tp,OBL q : tq ⇒ (OBL p : tp ⇒OBL s : ts) : tr (1)
whose reading is if p is true at time tp and q is obligatory at time tq, then the deontic rule
OBL p : tp⇒OBL s : ts is in force at time tr. In this work we develop a formal machinery
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to reason about rules like (1). In general we want to accommodate in our framework
rules of the type (a : t ⇒ b : t ′ : t ′′) where t and t ′ indicate the time at which a and b
hold, while t ′′ is the time of the rule being in force. To incorporate this simple temporal
reasoning we have to express whether events and states are permanent or immanent.
If we use non-monotonic rules as in some of the works above then deliberation means
reasoning about how to derive conclusions in terms of intentions/goals/plans, i.e., just
deriving conclusions from a theory. Though [4] proposes a deliberation language, it
considers only snapshots of the deliberation process in the sense that the deliberation
program is dependent on the agent’s current state (one cycle). Put in Bratman’s terms
to reason about intentions/goals/plans at t and decide for t. A complete solution would
require the addition of a temporal variable to allow reasoning about the deliberation
process after each time round [9].
A formal framework like the one developed in this paper is useful in the domain
of legal information systems to reason about normative conditionals [11,10]. Another
domain wherein the framework could be useful is with regard to policy-based rationality
as outlined by Bratman [2] in his pursuit for a temporally extended rational agency. The
principle can be roughly stated as follows:
– At t0 agent A deliberates about what policy to adopt concerning a certain range of
activities. On the basis of this deliberation agent A forms a general intention to ϕ
in circumstances of type ψ .
– From t0 to t1 A retains this general intention.
– At t1 A notes that he/she will be (is) in circumstance ψ at t2, where t2 ≥ t1.
– Based on the previous steps A forms the intention at t1 to ϕ at t2.
Notice that Bratman is concerned only with policy-based intentions3 and does not pro-
vide any formal framework to show the working aspect of his historical principle. In our
model we have temporal rules for beliefs, desires, intentions and obligations as in (1)
and a machinery based on defeasible logic (DL) to reason about such temporal rules.
Given the temporal nature of Bratman’s historical principle, and the idea that some
intentions can be retained from one moment to another, we must then account for two
types of temporal deliberations: transient deliberations, which hold only for an instant
of time, and persistent deliberations, in which an agent is going to retain them unless
some intervening event that forces the agent to reconsider her deliberation occurs. This
event can be just a brute fact or it can be a modification of the policy of the agent. Thus
an agent must be able to cope with changes of the environment but also of her policies.
Let us consider the following scenario. Our agent (Guido) has sent a paper to the
PRICAI-06 conference, and he has the intention to attend the conference to present
the paper if accepted. Guido’s school policy for funding is that if somebody intends to
travel then she has to submit the request for travel funds two weeks (15 days) before the
actual travel. This scenario can be represented as follows:
r1 (PRICAIpaperAccepted : t1 ⇒INT Travel : t2) : t0 (2)
r2 (INT Travel : tX ⇒OBL Request : tX−15) : t0 (3)
3 In [2] historical principles for deliberative as well as non-deliberative intentions is outlined.
Here we are concerned only with the policy-based aspect.
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Rule r1 states that Guido will form the intention to travel to PRICAI at a certain time
in case the paper is accepted and that the rule is in force from t0 (let us say that t0
is the time when the paper is submitted to the conference), and r2 encodes Guido’s
school travel policy (the policy is in force at time t0). Suppose that Guido, at time t1,
receives the notification that the paper has been accepted, then at that time he forms the
intention to travel to PRICAI at time t2. This triggers his obligation to have the travel
request submitted two weeks before the date of the conference. Accordingly, he plans
to prepare the required paperwork in due time.
Time passes and two important events happen: the School updates the travel policy
and Guido is appointed to a research-only position. The changes to the travel policy
concerns research-only staff and the actual change is that, due to the new accounting
software travel funds could be made available in less than one week. Thus the rule
encoding the update to the policy is
r3 (Research : tY ⇒ (INT Travel : tX ⇒OBL Request : tX−7) : t4) : t3
Here t3 is when the new policy has been issued and t4 is the time the new policy will
be effective. Based on the updated policy and the new event, Guido complies with
the new obligation if he submit the application for funds one week before travelling.
Accordingly, he can change his plans and can postpone to fill all forms to a later time.
2 Temporalised DL for Cognitive Agents
We focus on how mental attitudes and obligations jointly interplay in modelling agent’s
deliberation and behaviour. Such an interplay is modelled within a temporal setting.
The logical framework is based on DL, which is a simple and flexible sceptical non-
monotonic formalism that has proven able to represent various aspects of non-monotonic
reasoning. We extend here the machinery developed in [11,6,5] to represent tempo-
ralised motivational attitudes of agents.
The basic language is based on a (numerable) set of atomic propositions Prop =
{p,q, . . .}, a set of rule labels {r1,r2, . . .}, a discrete totally ordered set of instants of
time T = {t1, t2, . . .}, a set of modal operators M = {BEL,DES, INT,OBL} (belief,
desire, intention, and obligation, respectively), and the negation sign ¬. A plain literal
is either an atomic proposition or the negation of it. If l is a plain literal then, for any
X ∈M, Xl and ¬Xl are modal literals. A literal is either a plain literal or a modal literal.
Given a literal l, ∼l denotes the complement of l, that is, if l is a positive literal p then
∼l = ¬p, and if l = ¬p then ∼l = p. A temporal literal is a pair l : t where l is a literal
and t ∈T . Intuitively, a temporal literal l : t means that l holds at time t.
Knowledge in DL can be represented in two ways: facts and rules. Facts are indis-
putable statements, represented in the form of literal and modal literals. For example,
“John is a minor”. In the logic, this might be expressed as Minor(John). A rule is a re-
lation (represented by an arrow) between a set of premises (conditions of applicability
of the rule) and a conclusion. In this paper, conclusions usually correspond to literals,
but for a special class of rules they can also be rules themselves; in addition all the
conclusions and the premises will be qualified with the time when they hold. We con-
sider four classes of rules: rules for belief, desire, intention and obligation. Each class
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of rules is qualified by labelling the arrow with any X ∈M (for belief, desire, intention,
and obligation). If X ∈ {DES, INT,OBL}, applicability of the corresponding rules per-
mits to derive only literals: more precisely, if the consequent of such rules is a literal
l : t, then their applicability leads to obtain the modal literal Xl : t. For any consequent
l : t obtained through rules for X ∈ {DES, INT,OBL}, l : t is called a temporal goal.
Rules for belief play a special role. They constitute the basic inference mechanism of
an agent, as they concern the knowledge an agent has about the world. For this reason,
their conclusions, if obtained, are not modalised; on the other hand this is the only class
of rules for which conclusions can be also rules (rules for X ∈M).
Besides the above classification, rules can be partitioned according to their strength
into strict rules (denoted by→), defeasible rules (denoted by⇒) and defeaters (denoted
by;). Strict rules are rules in the classical sense: they are monotonic and whenever the
premises are indisputable so is the conclusion. Defeasible rules, on the other hand, are
non-monotonic: they can be defeated by contrary evidence. Defeaters are the weakest
rules: they do not support directly conclusions, but can be used to block the derivation
of opposite conclusions. Henceforth we use ↪→ as a metavariable for either → when
the rule is a strict rule,⇒ when the rule is a defeasible rule, and; when the rule is a
defeater. Thus we define the set of rule, Rules, using the following recursive definition:
– a rule is either a rule for X , X ∈M or the empty rule ⊥
– If r is a rule and t ∈ T , then r : t is a temporalised rule. (The meaning of a tempo-
ralised rule is that the rule is valid at time t.)
– Let A be a finite set of temporal literals,C be a temporal literal and r a temporalised
rule, then A ↪→X C, A ↪→X r are rules for X = BEL.
– Let A be a finite set of temporal literals and C be a temporal plain literal. Then
A ↪→X C is a rule for X ∈ {DES, INT,OBL}.
For a rule r labelled with any X ∈M we will use A(r) to indicate the body or antecedent
of the rule and C(r) for the head or consequent of the rule. It is also possible to have
nested rules i.e., rules occurring inside rules for beliefs. However, it is not possible for
a rule to occur inside itself. Thus for example, the following is a rule
p : tp,OBLq : tq ⇒BEL (OBLp : tp ⇒INT s : ts) : tr (4)
(4) means that if p is true at time tp and q is obligatory at time tq, then the intention
rule OBLp : tp ⇒INT s : ts is valid at time tr. Every temporalised rule is identified by its
rule label and its time. Formally we can express this relationship by establishing that
every rule label r is a function r :T 7→ Rules. Thus a temporalised rule r : t returns the
value/content of the rule ‘r’ at time t. This construction allows us to uniquely identify
rules by their labels, and to replace rules by their labels when rules occur inside other
rules. In addition there is no risk that a rule includes its label in itself. For example if
we associate the temporal rule (OBLp : tp ⇒INT s : ts) : tr to the pair r1 : tr, we can
concisely rewrite (4) as
p : tp,OBLq : tq ⇒BEL r1 : tr (5)
It should be noted that we have to consider two temporal dimensions for rules. The
first regards the efficacy (effectiveness) of a rule i.e., the capacity of a rule to produce a
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desired effect at a certain time point, and the second shows when the rule is valid/comes
into force. Consider the following two rules about a hypothetical tax regulation:
r1 : (Income> 90K : 1Mar⇒OBL Tax10 : 1Jan) : 1Jan : 15Jan (6)
r2 : (Income> 100K : 1Mar⇒OBL Tax40 : 1Jan) : 1Apr : 1Feb (7)
Rule r1 states that if the income of a person is in excess of ninety thousand as of 1st
March (Income > 90K : 1Mar) then he/she is obliged to pay the top marginal tax rate
of 10 percent from 1st January (Tax10 : 1Jan) with the policy being in force from 15
January, and effective from 1st January. This means that the norm becomes part of the
tax regulation from 15 January, but it is effective from 1st January. Accordingly, the
policy covers tax returns lodged after 15 January as well as all tax returns lodged before
the validity of the policy itself. The second rule, valid (i.e., part of the tax regulation)
from 1st February, establishes a top marginal tax rate of 40% for tax returns lodged
after the effectiveness date of 1st April.
The above two rules illustrate the difference between the effectiveness and valid-
ity of a rule. In order to differentiate between the effectiveness and validity of a rule
we introduce the notion of temporalised rule with viewpoint and 15 Jan in r1 denotes
exactly this. A conclusion or a temporalised rule with viewpoint is an expression s@t,
where t ∈ T , meaning that s “holds” when the agent reasons using the information
available to her at t. Thus the expression r1 : t1@t2 represents a rule r1 valid at time t2
and effective at time t1. In the case of (6) this could be given as s@16Jan where s is
(Income > 90K : 1Mar⇒OBL Tax10 : 1Jan) : 1Jan and t = 16Jan. Thus for an agent
intending to lodge a tax return on 16 Jan, there are no alternatives. She has to pay her
taxes at the top marginal rate of 10%. However, should she postpone the decision after
1 February, then she has the option to evaluate when and how much tax she has to pay
(10% if the tax return is lodged before 1 April and 40% if lodged afterward). Therefore
she can plan her actions in order to achieve the most suitable result according to her
goals. Hence, an agent equipped with such temporal rules should be able to figure out
plans that are applicable at a particular time point. Temporal rules like (7) are more
interesting, as they allow the agent to plan using rules having reference to past as well
as future time points. We discuss more about temporalised rule with viewpoint in sec-
tion 4. In addition the example shows that in general, unlike other approaches, there is
no need to impose constraints on the time instants involved in a rule.
Another issue we need to consider here is that we have two different types of condi-
tionals to derive beliefs and goals (i.e., rules labelled with X ∈M): conditionals that ini-
tiate a state of affairs which persists until an interrupting event occurs, and conditionals
where the conclusion is co-occurrent with the premises. To represent this distinction we
introduce a further distinction of rules, orthogonal to the previous one, where rules are
partitioned in persistent and transient rules. A persistent rule is a rule whose conclusion
holds at all instants of time after the conclusion has been derived, unless interrupting
events occur; transient rules, on the other hand, establish the conclusion only for a spe-
cific instant of time. We use the following notation to differentiate the various types of
rules: with ↪→tX we represent a transient rule for X , and with ↪→pX a persistent rule.
Given a set R of rules, we denote the set of strict rules in R by Rs, the set of strict
and defeasible rules in R by Rsd , the set of defeasible rules in R by Rd , and the set of
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defeaters in R by Rdft. R[q : t] denotes the set of rules in R with consequent q : t. We use
RX for the set of rules for X ∈M. The set of transient rules is denoted by Rtr and the set
of persistent rules by Rper. Finally we assume a set of rule modifiers. A rule modifier is
a function m : Rules×T 7→ Rules×T .
The above constructions allow us to use rule modifiers on rule labels. Thus m(r1 :
t1) : t2 returns the rule obtained from r1 as such at time t1 after the application of the
modification corresponding to the function m and the result refers to the content of the
rule at time t2. Given this basic notion of rule modifier, we can define some functional
predicates, i.e. specific rule-modifications. For the sake of brevity, we omit the technical
details on how to adapt the basic definition of rule modifier to cover these specific rule
modifications: Delete, Update and Add. As we shall see, these functional predicates can
only occur in the head of belief rules. For the moment let us see their intuitive reading.
The functional predicate Delete(r) : t ′ says that a given rule r is deleted at t ′. More
precisely, Delete(r) : t ′ assigns the empty rule r : (⊥) : t ′ to r as holding at t. The rule
r is thus dropped at t ′ from the system and so, at t ′, r is no longer valid. If r is a rule
for X ∈ {DES, INT,OBL}, let A and C be a set of temporal literals and a temporal
plain literal respectively; if r is a rule for belief, let A be defined as before, while C is
a temporal plain literal or a temporalised rule. Then
Update(r,A ) : t ′ Update(r,C ) : t ′
say that we operate, at t ′ an update of r which replaces a subset or all components in
the antecedent of r with other appropriate components and the consequent with a new
appropriate element of the language. The new version of r will hold at t ′. Similarly
Add(r′,A(r′),C(r′)) : t ′
indicates that a new rule r′ is added at t ′ to the system, and that r′ has the antecedent
and consequent specified by A(r′) andC(r′).
3 Conflicts between Rule Modifications
Table 1 summarises the basic conflicts between rule modifications. Notice that conflicts
Modifications Conditions
Delete(r) : t ′ Update(r,A ) : t ′′ t ′ = t ′′
Delete(r) : t ′ Update(r,C ) : t ′′ t ′ = t ′′
Delete(r) : t ′ Add(r,A(r),C(r)) : t ′′ t ′ = t ′′
Table 1. Conflicts
obtain only if the conflicting modifications apply to the same time instant. Deleting a
rule r is incompatible with any update of r (first and second rows from the top). This is
the only case of real conflict. In fact, the third row from the top considers a “residual”
but in theory possible conflict between modifications, namely, between those of deleting
and adding at the same time a rule r. This case is marginal essentially because adding a
rule r usually means that r is not valid in the theory. However, nothing prevents to add a
rule r which is already valid in the system. In this case, the operation is redundant, but,
if performed together with deleting r, we have indeed a conflict between modifications.
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4 Temporalised Rule with View Point
In [11] we showed how to derive temporal literals in a DL framework. But this is of
limited use and what we need is a way to derive temporal rules. In this section we extend
the framework developed in [11,6,5] with temporal rules with a view point. What this
means is that we can reason about temporal rules that are valid at a particular instant of
time. Suppose that we have a defeasible theory D = (T ,F,R,≺) where T is discrete
totally ordered set of instants of time, F is a finite set of temporalised literals, R a finite
set of rules (comprising strict, defeasible and defeater rules) and ≺ a ternary relation
(superiority relation) over R×R×T , meaning that one rule is stronger than another
rule at a particualr time; for example r1 ≺t r2 means that rule r2 is stronger than rule r1
at time t. Conclusions in DL can have one of the following four forms (where X ranges
overM):
+∆X@t q : t ′ meaning that q is definitely provable with mode X , at time t ′ with view-
point t, in D (i.e., using only facts and strict rules).
−∆X@t q : t ′ meaning that we have proved that q is not definitely provable with mode
X , at time t ′ with viewpoint t, in D.
+∂X@t q : t ′ meaning that q is defeasibly provable with mode X , at time t ′ with view-
point t, in D
−∂X@t q : t ′ meaning that we have proved that q is not defeasibly provable with mode
X , at time t ′ with viewpoint t, in D.
For example, +∂OBL@t1 q : t0 means that we have a defeasible proof for OBLq at t0,
or, in other words, that OBLq holds at time t0 when we use the rules in force in the
system at time t1. However, these tags do not take care whether a conclusion q : t is
obtained via transient rules (that is, q holds only at time t0) or via persistent rules, in
such a case for every t ′ such that t0 < t ′, the property q persists at time t ′, unless we have
other evidence on the contrary, i.e., a piece of evidence that terminates the property q.
To reflect these issues, we introduce auxiliary proof tags for persistent and transient
conclusions. Formally,+∆X@t pmeans that either+∆ trX @t p or+∆
pr
X @t p, i.e., either
p is transient at t or it is persistent at t; −∆X@t p means both −∆ trX @t p or −∆ prX @t p,
i.e., it is not true that p is transient at t and that p is not persistent at t.
The proof tags are labelled with the mode used to derive the rule, according to
their appropriate proof conditions. It is not possible to give the complete set of proof
conditions in this paper. Here we concentrate only on the proof conditions to derive
defeasible persistence of both rules with belief mode, and literals. The proof conditions
given here are extensions of those given in [11] for the temporal aspects and can be
used for goals and planning as in [6,5]. The proof conditions missing in this paper can
be obtained from the corresponding conditions of [11,6,5] using the same intuition on
which the proof conditions we are going to show illustrate.
Provability is based on the concept of a derivation (or proof) in D. A derivation is
a finite sequence P= (P(1), . . . ,P(n)) of tagged literals satisfying the proof conditions
(which correspond to inference rules for each of the kinds of conclusion). P(1..n) de-
notes the initial part of the sequence P of length n. A strict derivation (i.e., a conclusion
tagged with ∆ ) is a monotonic derivation using forward chaining of rules, i.e., modus
38 G. Governatori, V. Padmanabhan and A. Rotolo
ponens. In DL a defeasible derivation, on the other hand, has three phases. In the first
phase we propose an argument in favour of the concussion we want to prove. In the
simplest case this consists of an applicable rule for the conclusion (a rule is applicable
if the antecedent of it has already been proved). Then in the second phase we exam-
ine all possible counter-arguments (rules for the opposite conclusion). Finally we have
to rebut the counter-arguments. Thus we have to provide evidence against the counter-
argument. Accordingly, we can demonstrate that the argument is not as such (i.e., some
of its premises are not provable), or we can show that the counter-argument is weaker
than an argument for the conclusion.
For persistent conclusions we have another method. We can use a derivation of the
conclusion at a previous time provided that no terminating event occurred in between.
In [11] the rules are given, but here rules are can also be derived. Thus in the proof
conditions we have to cater for this option. Accordingly, we have to give conditions that
allows us to derive rules instead of literals. For the sake of simplicity we will assume
that all rules in R can be overruled/modified. Then we have to extend the notation R[x : t]
to the case where x is a rule label (and rule-modifiers). Given a set of belief rules R and
a set of rule modifiersM = {m1, . . . ,mn}, then
R[r : tr] = {s ∈ R : A(s) = mi(v : tv) and mi(v : tv) = r : tr}
R[r : tr] gives the set of nested rules whose head results in the rule r : tr after the appli-
cation of the rule modifier; and
R[∼r : tr] = {s ∈ R : A(s) = mi(r : tr) and mi(r : tr) is in conflict with r : tr}
The set R[∼r : tr] gives the set of rules that modify r : tr and the modification is in
conflict with the r : tr, see Table 1 for such conflicts.
We can now give the proof conditions for +∂ pr to derive a rule.
If P(n+1) = +∂ prBEL@t r : tr then
1a) r : tr@t ∈ RBEL or
1b) ∃s : ts ∈ RBEL[r : tr] such that +∂BEL@t s : ts ∈ P(1..n) and
∀Yaa : t ′ ∈ A(s),+∂Ya@t a : t ′ ∈ P(1..n); and
2) ∀v : tv ∈ RBEL[∼r : tr] if +∂BEL@t v : tv ∈ P(1..n), then either
2.1) ∃Ybb : t ′′ ∈ A(v) such that −∂Yb@t b : t ′′ ∈ P(1..n) or
2.2 a) v : tv ≺t r : tr if 1a obtain or b) v : tv ≺t s : ts if 1b obtain; or
3) +∂ prBEL@t
′ r : tr ∈ P(1..n), t ′ < t and
3.1) ∀t ′′, t ′ ≤ t ′′ < t,∀s : ts ∈ R[∼r : tr] if +∂BEL@t ′′ s : ts ∈ P(1..n), then
3.1.1) ∃Yaa : ta ∈ A(s),−∂Ya@t ′′ a : ta ∈ P(1..n) or ts < tr; and
4) +∂ prBEL@t r : t
′
r ∈ P(1..n), t ′r < tr and
4.1) ∀t ′, t ′r ≤ t ′′ < tr,∀s : ts ∈ R[∼r : tr] if +∂BEL@t ′ s : ts ∈ P(1..n), then
4.1.1) ∃Yaa : ta ∈ A(s),−∂Ya@t ′ a : ta ∈ P(1..n) or ts < t ′r.
Let us briefly examine the above proof conditions. To prove a rule at time t, the rule
must be in force at time t, i.e., the rule must be one of the given rules (condition 1a).
There is a second possibility that the rule is derived from another rule. The second rule
must be provable and applicable at t (condition 1b). However, this is not enough since
there could have been modifications to the rule effective at t. Thus we have to show
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that either all eventual modifications were not applicable (2.1) or the modifications
were not successful since they were defeated (2.2a and 2.2b). Finally the rule could be
provable because it was persistent, i.e., it was persistently in force before (3), and no
modification occurred in between. The possible modifications in force after the rule was
in force were not applicable to the rule. Or (4) the rule was persistently effective before,
and its effectiveness was not revoked.
The conditions for positive persistent defeasible proofs are as follows:
If P(n+1) = +∂ prX @t q : t
′ then
1) +∆ prX @t q : t
′ ∈ P(1..n), or
2) −∆X@t ∼q : t ′ ∈ P(1..n), and
2.1) ∃r : tr ∈ RX ,prsd [q : t ′]: +∂BEL@t r : tr ∈ P(1..n), and
∀Yaa : ta ∈ A(r : tr),+∂Ya@t a : ta ∈ P(1..n) and
2.2) ∀s : ts ∈ RX [∼q : t]: if +∂BEL@t s : ts, then either
2.2.1) ∃Yaa : ta ∈ A(s : ts),−∂Ya@t a : ta ∈ P(1..n); or
2.2.2) ∃w : tw ∈ RX [q : t]: +∂BEL@t w : tw ∈ P(1, ,n) and
∀Yaa ∈ A(w : tw),+∂Ya@t a : tw ∈ P(1..n) and w s; or
3) ∃t ′′ ∈T : t ′′ < t and +∂ prX @t ′′ q : t ′ ∈ P(1..m) and
3.1) ∀t ′′′ t ′′ < t ′′′ ≤ t ∀s : ts ∈ RX [∼q : t ′]: if +∂BEL@t ′′′ s : ts ∈ P(1..n), then
3.1.1) ∃Yaa : ta ∈ A(s : ts),−∂Ya@t ′′′ a : ta ∈ P(1..n) or
3.1.2) ∃v : tv ∈ RX [q : t ′],+∂BEL@t ′′′ v : tv ∈ P(1..n) and
∀Ybb : tb ∈ A(v : tv)+∂Yb@t ′′′ b : tb ∈ P(1..n) and s : ts ≺t ′′′ v : tv; or
4) ∃t ′′ ∈T : t ′′ < t ′ and +∂ prX @t q : t ′′ ∈ P(1..m) and
4.1) ∀t ′′′ t ′′ < t ′′′ ≤ t ′ ∀s : ts ∈ RX [∼q : t ′′′]: if +∂ prBEL@t s : ts ∈ P(1..n), then
4.1.1) ∃Yaa : ta ∈ A(s : ts),−∂Ya@t a : ta ∈ P(1..n) or
4.1.2) ∃v : tv ∈ RX [q : t ′′′]+∂BEL@t v : tv ∈ P(1..n) and
∀Ybb : tb ∈ A(v : tv)+∂Yb@t b : tb ∈ P(1..n) and s : ts ≺t ′′′ v : tv.
Clause 1 of the above proof condition allows us to infer a defeasible persistent con-
clusion from a strict persistent conclusion with the same mode. Clause 2 requires that
the complement of the literal we want to prove is not definitely provable (or definitely
provable for −∂ ), but it does not specify whether it is persistent or transient: remember
that what we want to achieve is to see whether the literal or its complement are provable
at t but not both; in the same way, and for the same reason, q can be attacked by any
rule for the complement of q (clauses 2.2.1). An important issue in all clauses of this
proof condition is that each time we have to use a rule (either to support the conclu-
sion (2.1), to attack it (2.2) or to rebut the attack (2.2.2)) we must have that the rule is
provable at time t of the derivation (@t). Clauses 3 and 4 are the clauses implementing
persistence (i.e., the conclusion has been derived at a previous time and carries over to
the current time). Essentially clause 3 ensures that the conclusion has been derived at
a previous time t ′′ and no interrupting event occurred between t ′′ and t; while clause 4
takes care of the case where q is derived persistently for a time before t ′, and that no
interrupting event will occur between the effectiveness of q and the time q is expected
to hold according to the current derivation.
5 Summary
In this paper we combined and extended the approaches presented in [11] and [6,5]. In
particular we have extended the programming cognitive agents approach with tempo-
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ralised literals. This makes the resulting logic more expressive and more suitable for the
task at hand. In addition we have introduced the notion of view-point. The deliberation
of an agent based on a policy depends not only on the environment but also on the rules
in force in the policy at the time of deliberation and at the time when the plan resulting
from the deliberation will be executed. These two aspects are neglected in the litera-
ture on agent planning. In addition the framework we propose can handle revision of
theories in the same way the framework is inspired to handle complex modification of
normative codes [10]. An aspect we did not consider here is how to extend the temporal
framework to reason with actions and their duration. This matter is left for future work.
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